Determinants of Cartel Formation and Survival in Bulgaria during the late years of economic transition (2001-2010): the case of the food sector by Ruseva, Vyara
1 
 
Determinants of Cartel Formation and Survival in Bulgaria during the late years of 
economic transition (2001-2010): the case of the food sector 
 
Name of Student: Vyara Ruseva; Programme: BA (Hons) Business Economics;  Year of 
Study: 3;                           
Mentored by:  Dr. Helen Mercer 
 
 
Abstract 
A strong upward trend in cartel investigations and discoveries in Bulgaria between 2001 and 2005, 
raises questions regarding the factors that have pushed firms towards collusion and helped them to 
sustain it. This research compares the determinants of cartel formation in Bulgaria, (obtained through 
the analysis of information from the available 84 decision reports provided by the Bulgarian 
Commission for the Protection of Competition) with empirical evidence provided by Levenstein and 
Syslow (2006) derived from their analysis of other cartel samples. This study finds that 40% of 
Bulgarian cartels in this sample were in the food sector. Most of the examined agreements are 
classified as successful and shared similar determinants for formation to the ones identified in the 
literature. Yet, the paper finds that behavioural factors, such as social and cultural cohesion, as well as 
the involvement of trade associations have been the most important for cartels’ success. Moreover, it 
concludes that EU membership as well as the growing importance of non-domestically owned 
companies in the food sector, have pushed firms towards forming defensive collusive agreements. 
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Introduction 
 
Mainstream economics views competitive markets as a necessary prerequisite for 
optimal efficiency, economic development and growth. Market failure, however, in the form 
of monopoly and anti-competitive practices is an ever-present danger (Godfrey, 2008). The 
most common form of anticompetitive practice is the cartel, defined as ”an agreement and/or 
concerted practice between two or more undertakings, competitors on the relevant market, 
aimed at restricting competition through price fixing or fixing pricing conditions for purchase 
or sale, allocation of production quotas or sales or allocation of markets, including in rigging 
of public bids or tenders or public procurement award procedures” (International Competition 
Network, 2009:3). The aim of collusive agreements is eventually to restrict output and 
increase price, ideally to a level that a monopolist would set, and achieve jointly maximized 
profits.However, in order to be successful, cartels need to achieve a high level of consensus, 
coordination and compliance among the members, and be able to detect cheating as well as to 
ensure the proper enforcement of the agreement. In order to overcome problems like 
coordination, deviation from the agreement or entry, companies employ a variety of 
monitoring tools, reward schemes and punishments (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006). Thus the 
driving forces behind their survival or breakdown are a matter of intense debate.  
This article summarises that debate and identifies the value of its insights in 
understanding the process of cartel formation and survival in an emerging market economy – 
Bulgaria. Bulgaria is a country that not long ago made the transition from a planned to a 
market economy. The process of privatisation has been long and inefficient due to high levels 
of corruption and other political factors, and it was only in 2001 that the presence of private 
businesses became a dominant feature of the economy (Hoekman and Djankov, 1997; 
Damyanova et al., 2003). The improving economic environment since then has been 
described as “sluggish and quite painful”, in which unregulated economic interests have 
hindered the progress of reforms (Minassian, 2002:1). The country experienced a period of 
stable GDP growth between 2001 and 2008, followed by a sharp contraction in mid-2008 (by 
nearly 10%), associated with the global crisis (IMF, 2010).  
Parallel with the development of a market economy has been the gradual development 
of restraints on anti-competitive behavior. In 1991 Bulgaria introduced the Law on Protection 
of Competition (LPC), which focused only on cases of abuse of dominant position, and this 
was extended in 1998 to allow investigation of cartels (Boyanov, 2011). At the same time a 
Commission for Protection of Competition (CPC) was established in the early 1990s and 
recently became more active in detecting cartel agreements. Between 2001 and 2010 the 
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Commission published reports regarding 84 of the cartel investigations, which were 
undertaken.  Their enquiries have provided a rich seam of data and information on the 
determinants of cartel formation in Bulgaria, which can then be compared with Levenstein 
and Suslows’s empirical evidence. As to date no public research on the broad characteristics 
of Bulgarian cartels is available, this article is both a contribution to the academic 
understanding of cartel behaviours, and may also prove useful for their future investigation in 
Bulgaria.   
 
Literature Review 
In order to characterize the nature of Bulgarian cartels as they have emerged since the 
1990s, it is useful to review the factors the academic literature sees as significant in the 
formation and longevity of cartels. The key factors which authors have isolated then provide 
the framework for the analysis of Bulgarian cartels. Some studies suggest that high levels of 
market concentration, defined as the degree to which small number of companies control a 
large part of the market, facilitates cartel formation, while others argue that in fact many 
cartels appear to be in industries regarded as having low levels of concentration (Levenstein 
and Suslow, 2006; Posner, 1970). Symeonidis (2003) hypothesizes that high concentration is 
associated with firm asymmetries or the presence of dominant firms, because an industry 
characterized by an absence of dominant firms is assumed to experience difficulty in 
colluding. On the other hand, research also indicates that trade associations can act as if the 
industries were highly concentrated, and so allow cartels to overcome the difficulties imposed 
by the market characteristics of the industry (Escrihuela-Villar and Guillen, 2011). This 
situation, however, is only sustainable, where a critical mass of firms are cartel members, and 
where the association has powerful means of disciplining member firms. Reviewing the 
evidence Symeonidis (2003) identifies a link between capital-intensive industries and high 
concentration, and suggests that, in fact, it could be the capital intensity factor that facilitates 
collusion rather than the industry concentration. As important for cartel formation could be 
the customer concentration. While some authors like Stigler (1964) argue that the presence of 
large customers, i.e. oligopsony, increases the incentive for a cartel members to cheat, 
reducing the cartle’s stability: on the other hand empirical evidence derived studies of modern 
international cartels shows that successful collusion is also possible in the presence of large 
customers (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006).  
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Some industries and products appear especially prone to cartel formation: agriculture, 
stone, glass-making, chemical and agricultural food production, printing and publishing 
(Symeonidis, 2003).  This indicates that collusive agreements are likely to form in 
oligopolistic markets with standardized and homogeneous products, like essential foods with 
relatively inelastic demand, allowing the management of the cartel to be more decentralized 
and easier to maintain (Severova, et. al. 2011; Baker and Faulkner, 1993). One study, 
focusing on the food manufacturing sector, sees the key influences on cartel formation being 
the desire to eliminate price cutting in the presence of excess capacity, to fight against 
overseas competition, to counter monopolist or another association, associated with the 
formation of collusive agreements (Cuthbert and Black, 1961). 
The existing literature identifies trade associations as the most often used mechanism 
for information sharing and decision-making, which allows firms to monitor each other’s 
behaviour and to limit the members’ incentives to cheat by imposing penalties (Griffin, 2000; 
Levenstein and Suslow, 2006). Social and cultural cohesion like common bonds and shared 
culture are found to be beneficial in sustaining the cartel organization (Hugo Van Driel, 
2000). Also, learning from prior cartel failures is identified as a determinant of successful 
cartels since empirical evidence shows that every next cartel formation in the same sector 
tends to be longer lasting and more successful than the previous one (Marquez, J. 1994). The 
importance of economic growth for successful collusion is widely discussed in the literature, 
with some authors arguing that there is no clear and uniform relationship between market 
growth and the likelihood of collusion (Symeonidis 2003; Levenstein and Suslow 2010), and 
others arguing that cartels are more likely to form in markets with moderate growth rather 
than in rapidly declining or growing markets (Suslow, 2005; Dick, 1996).  
Turning next to the causes for cartel breakdown, the literature indicates two main 
causes:  “natural death”, due to financial instability, defection, conflicts or entry; and “death 
by antitrust”, which is considered to have the greatest impact on cartels. Realising the great 
importance of antitrust authorities in the prosecution of cartels, researchers have tried to 
examine their real impact on competition. Investigation of the activities of the Bulgarian 
competition office for the period 1991-1995 shows that the Commission’s cartel prosecution 
efforts have not been very effective due to its focus on “unfair” competition cases rather than 
on hard-core cartels (Hoekman and Djankov, 1997; Boyanov, 2011). Besides, all imposed 
fines have been relatively low, which may have lessened their deterrent effect. But a stricter 
law may not make the market structure more competitive, for in a market where one or more 
partial cartels operate, any increase in the maximum amount of fine risks pushing firms into 
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coarser coalitions, especially in low concentrated industries, and during high demand periods 
(Bartolini and Zazzaro, 2009).  
In conclusion, the above-presented studies identify the most common determinants for 
cartel formation and success, and hence could be used as a model framework for the analysis 
of the determinants for cartel formation in Bulgaria. 
 
Research Methodology 
 
This article uses the factors outlined in Levenstein and Suslow’s (2006) article “What 
Determines Cartel Success” to begin the analysis of Bulgarian cartels.  The research 
proceeded by analysing all 84 cases investigated by the Commission between 1999 and 2010 
and codes them for cartel duration, number of participants, involvement of trade association, 
type of restrictive practice, elasticity of demand, product characteristics, raw materials 
suppliers’ and buyers’ concentrations. This initial sift indicated that the food sector cartels 
dominated the sample - a characteristic Bulgaria holds in common with the European 
experience, (European Competition Network, 2012). These food cartels were analysed more 
extensively using reports from the CPC, the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB), EBRD and 
FAO. 
 
Findings 
 
The following information regarding cartel investigations in Bulgaria was derived from the 
Commission for Protection of Competition’s database. 
 
Fig.1 Number of Investigated, Detected and Established cartels (2001-2011) 
Source: CPC and own calculations 
 
Table 1 Cartels in Bulgaria (2001-2010) 
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Source: CPC’s decision reports archive 
 
  
 
Fig. 2 Discovered cartel agreements by Industry Sector (Bulgaria, 2001-2010) 
Source: CPC Decision Reports and own calculations 
 
An interesting trend emerging from the sample is the fact that 40% of the Bulgarian 
cartels, discovered between 2001 and 2011, were in the food sector. All cartels, except one, 
were formed in 2002 (Table 1). The majority lasted between 5 and 6 years (Table 3), which 
classifies them as successful cartels. Worth noting is also the reluctance of firms to use 
whistle blowing even though the CPC introduced a leniency clause in 2003 (Table 1). 
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Table 2 Food Sector Cartels 
Source: CPC Decision Reports  
* 1- Minimum Retail Price fixing; 2- Purchase price for raw materials fixing; 3- 
Minimum Export Price fixing; 4- Allocation of quotas; 5- Restricting the export of raw 
materials; 6- Discounts fixing 
All of the observed food sector cartels were “hard core cartels”, which aimed at 
fixing a minimum price for their products, sales quotas, etc. (Table 3).  
As mentioned earlier, the type of correlation that exists between the number of firms 
in a cartel and its duration is still debatable. In this sample, the correlation coefficient between 
these two variables is 0,280667, suggesting a weak positive correlation. The joint market 
share of each of the examined cartels is over 65%, with two of the cartels actually possessing 
100% of the market. Furthermore, the correlation coefficient between the number of cartel 
firms and the market share of the cartel, is -0,53405, meaning that there is a reasonably strong 
negative correlation between the two variables, and thus, suggesting that the fewer the cartel 
members, the more powerful and stable they are. Yet, one should bare in mind the fact that 
the available data set used for the calculation of the above presented correlation coefficients is 
very limited and hence the conclusions resulting from it may not be entirely reliable. 
Industry concentration is often linked to cartel formation. In the present sample the 
market concentration varies sufficiently from one case to another. Cartels in relatively low 
concentrated markets were bread making and dairy processing (CR4 – 34%), cartels in 
medium and highly concentrated markets were sunflower oil (CR4 – 52%) production, and 
poultry (CR4 – 96%) and eggs breeders (CR4 - 69%), (CPC, Bulgarian Chamber of 
Commerce, 2011; Ministry of Economy, Energy and Tourism, 2010). As a result, it is 
impossible to conclude whether the industry concentration is an essential prerequisite for 
8 
 
successful cartels. Yet, all cartels that operated in low concentrated markets, are likely to owe 
their success to trade associations, which are well known for their ability to facilitate 
collusion.  
Customer characteristics are as important for and can have huge impact on the 
functioning of cartels. All of the examined cartels are companies in the processing stage of the 
production chain, and their customers represent both small convenience stores and big 
supermarkets.  The grocery sector in Bulgaria is still quite fragmented, with the top five 
grocery retailers only accounting for 20% of the total sales in the country in 2007 (Oxford 
Business Group, 2008). Yet they have a significant bargaining power, especially in the eggs 
and chicken product markets, where supermarkets have 30% market share (CPC, 2008). All 
that may have had a destabilising effect over the cartel, and thus contributed to its breakdown 
in 2008. In addition, several of the biggest retailers in the country are being investigated by 
the CPC due to suspicion of a cartel agreement (CPC, 2004, No. 253).  
Meanwhile, raw material suppliers’ characteristics suggest a very low concentration 
(CPC; USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, 2011).  In sunflower seeds, raw milk and wheat, 
the food sector cartels took full advantage of the fragmentation among the suppliers of raw 
materials. Based on the above analysis, and in accordance with the evidence by Stigler (1964) 
and Levenstein and Suslow (2006), both customers’ and raw materials producers’ low 
concentrations seem beneficial for the stability of cartels. As mentioned by Symeonidis 
(2003), the food and agriculture sector is a typical place for collusion to occur, a fact largely 
explained by the characteristics of the goods sold by cartelists in those markets. The products 
involved in the current sample of cartels are bread, sunflower oil, dairy products (specifically 
white and yellow cheese), poultry and eggs.  All of them are perishable products, for which 
there is a great, inelastic consumer demand. The culture and eating habits of households 
determine them as traditional products, used on a daily basis, and which can hardly be 
substituted. Such product qualities enhance cartelists’ ability to increase prices, gaining higher 
profits and yet, leaving demand unaffected. Besides, private cartel costs associated mainly 
with monitoring costs are found to be lower for standardized products, which is another 
reason why cartels tend to form in markets with that sort of products (Dick, 1995).  
Successful cartels develop very good information sharing and decision making 
mechanisms. Table 4 presents data regarding the different mechanisms of cooperation 
employed by cartels in the Bulgarian food sector. 
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Table 4        Mechanisms of cooperation used by Bulgarian food cartels
 
Mechanism of cooperation 
Cartel 
Number*
Trade association/union 1,2,3,4,5,6
Powerful players 5,6
Use of media and publications in professional
newspapers 1,2,3,5,6
Support from local authorities 1,2
Regular meetings 3,5,6
Collection of sensitive information 1,2,3,4,5,6
Provision of sample contracts and regular checks of their
implementation 1,2,4
Regular collection of samples from shops in order to
assertain the quality of the product corresponds to its
price (as agreed by cartel) 4
Bonuses and penalties schemes 1,2,4
Powerful and respectd union 3
Establishment of a commission for pricing strategies and
monitoring 5,6
Sending ewsletters with recent updates to all members 5,6  
Source: CPC Decision Reports and own analysis  
* 
1- Bread makers cartel (’03); 2- Bread makers cartel (’08); 3- Sunflower oil producers cartel; 
4- Dairy processors cartel; 5- Eggs cartel; 6- Chicken breeders cartel;  
The success of all of the examined food sector cartels is largely explained by the 
involvement of some sort of a trade association, or union. One of the most important 
associations’ qualities is its ability to collect market sensitive information (i.e. regarding 
current stocks and production capacities) and then use it for monitoring purposes, as well as to 
enforce the articles of the anticompetitive agreement. Members who broke the agreement 
were sanctioned to pay a penalty, which was then used by the association to compensate any 
disadvantaged firms. Moreover, trade associations in the sample were recognized as bodies 
with authority and high reputation. Small firms assumed that the union and the leading firms 
had better knowledge of the market conditions and were able to determine the most accurate 
price for their products, which turned them into price takers. Moreover, trade associations 
achieved the crucial and most challenging objective of creating a trust among members that 
has fundamentally contributed to cartels’ success. The use of media and specialized 
professional newspapers has been used successfully by Bulgarian cartels to increase demand. 
The role of the state is as important. Some of the cartels in this sample turned to the 
state to limit exports of their input materials (sunflower oil producers); to increase subsidies 
for farmers (dairy products cartel); to introduce a standardised price with bonus system 
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according to quality received (dairy processors), while others received an explicit support 
from local authorities (CPC, 2008, No. 650; 622; 1150).  
Furthermore, regular meetings helped collusion through constant discussions and 
updates of the cartels’ objectives and strategies. Evidence for the effectiveness of those 
meeting could be seen in Figures 3 and 4 below, showing how prices increased after each 
association meeting.  
 
Fig. 3 Average wholesale and retail price of eggs, monthly (2002-2007) 
Source: System for Agricultural Market Information (SAPI) 
*
Smiley face indicates a union meeting 
 
Fig. 4 Average wholesale and retail price of poultry meat, monthly (2002-2007) 
Source: System for Agricultural Market Information (SAPI) 
*
Smiley face indicates a union meeting 
The importance of non-economic organizational factors, like social and cultural 
cohesion, for the stability of collusive agreements, should also be examined. High levels of 
risk and uncertainty may be crucial for cartel formation, but the presence of social relations 
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between executives together with mutual trust determine whether sustained collusion is 
actually realised (Driel, 2000: 402). Similarities in social background and geographical 
proximity, which apply to Bulgarian cartels, have played a vital role for their stability.  
Finally, two macroeconomic factors may have determined firms’ decision to collude. 
First, these cartels were formed and sustained during a period of steady growth (2002-2007), 
(NSI). However, they were also the likely response to the growth in foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in the food processing industry (Damyanova, 2003), illustrated in Figure 7.  
 
 
Fig. 7 FDI in food processing (1998-2004) USD m 
Source: InvestBulgaria Agency, Bulgarian National Bank 
 
FDI posed a threat to domestic companies, providing them with a strong motive to collude. 
Likewise, Bulgaria’s accession to the EU had a significant impact on the country’s small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs), (Andreev, 2009; Yorgova, 2011). EU standards and 
regulations related to the food industry, planned to come into force from 2007, as well as the 
expected competition from the EU market, were identified as factors which were going to 
dramatically change the scene in which rural SMEs operated (EBRD and FAO, 2003). 
Investment needs were expected to increase severely, which resulted in higher levels of 
indebtedness and established a stronger requirement for firms to achieve constant levels of 
profits, pressuring them and pushing them towards collusion.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This research found that Bulgarian cartels exhibited a trend similar to the European 
experience, where 40% of the collusive agreements in the country between 2001 and 2010 
represented domestic food-processing cartels aiming to fix prices and allocate production 
quotas. The majority of cartels lasted for more than 5 years, defining them as successful, and 
implying that they have managed to employ successful mechanisms and strategies in order to 
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sustain their agreements. Overall, Bulgarian cartels appear to have very similar determinants 
for cartel formation to the ones identified by Levenstein and Suslow (2006). The sample 
observations suggest that the fewer the market shares of fringe firms, the more stable the 
cartel is. Furthermore, the low concentration of raw materials producers was found beneficial 
for cartels’ stability, while buyers’ concentration and the presence of big supermarket chains 
were identified as possible causes for cartel breakdown. It isn’t surprising that cartels’ 
products were homogeneous goods with stable and relatively inelastic demand, which 
significantly contributed to the reduction of collusion difficulties. Behavioural factors like 
social and cultural cohesion prove vital for the successful cartel operation in the Bulgarian 
food sector. Moreover, trade associations are found to be the most important determinant for 
cartels’ success due to their ability to cover the illegal cartel meetings and employ strict 
cooperation and compliance control mechanisms, as well as a variety of penalties and side 
payments instruments. Additionally, cartels managed to create trust among members, which 
allowed them to successfully overcome the challenging cheating temptation, outlined in game 
theory.  
While this research did not find a clear link between growth and cartel formation, and 
stability, it identified some positive correlation between FDI to companies with foreign steak 
and cartel formation. Above all, the EU membership was found to have resulted in new and 
more demanding industry regulations and sector requirements, which have in turn led to 
substantial increase in firms’ costs of investments and levels of indebtedness. Hence, firms 
were more likely to form a cartel in order to deal with the anticipated higher level of market 
competition associated with the country’s accession to the EU.  
In conclusion, the findings of this research suggest that food sector firms had to deal 
with high levels of risk and uncertainty due to financial and other business development 
difficulties, typical the period 2001-2010, which pushed them towards collusion. The analysis 
suggests that the promotion of leniency, the closer monitoring of trade associations’ activities 
and the prospect of cooperation between the individual NCAs may result in stronger 
understanding and better detection rates of cartels. 
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